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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERBLY

THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF NONSUIT.
(With West Virginia Annotations)

By NErL C.

HEAD*

HE common law nonsuit is closely allied to several other modes
by which the plaintiff's action came to an end before judgment,
namely, discontinuance, non prosequitur,nolle prosequiand retraxit. Each of these has varied at different times in its development
or decay, and while they overlap to a certain extent, they can be
differentiated.
The term discontinuance at early common law was used in the
substantive law of real property, this being the only meaning
known to Lord Coke. But it soon same to be used in pleading and
practice, being confined for a time to a failure by the plaintiff to
continue the cause regularly from day to day, or term to term, between the commencement of the action and final judgment, but
gradually being extended to mean practically any discontinuance
of an action by the plaintiff. It may be either voluntary, as where
the plaintiff withdraws his action, or involuntary, as where in consequence of some omission or mispleading the action is deemed out
of court. The common-law voluntary discontinuance and the nonsuit differed fundamentally in only one way, the plaintiff had no
absolute right to discontinue, the consent of the judge being necessary,' while a nonsuit was a matter of right. The involuntary
discontinuance arose from the plaintiff's error or failure to go forward. 2 A discontinuance was not a decision on the merits and left
the plaintiff free to begin another action for the same cause.
Non prosequitur originally meant the judgment given against
the plaintiff for not declaring, replying, or surrejoining. This was
called judgment of non pros., and later that came to be the name of
the judgment entered against the plaintiff when he withdrew at

T

* Of the Chicago, Ill. Bar.
1 "Whatever may be said as to the absolute right of a plaintiff to suffer a voluntary

nonsuit, it cannot be said that he ever had an absolute right either at common law
Lamb v. Greenhouse, 69 Pa. Super. Ct. 329, 332
or by statute to discontinue."
(914).
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any stage of the proceedings,3 thus covering both discontinuance
and, less frequently, nonsuit. The term is loosely used, and today conveys no very clear meaning.
A nolle prosequi in civil actions is an agreement not to proceed either against some of the defendants or as to a part of the
suit.4 Originally it was confused with a retraxit, and barred
future action by the plaintiff, but it early became the same as a
discontinuance, leaving the plaintiff free to begin another action
for the same cause, except where the judgment rendered against
the remaining defendants, or as to the part of the cause continued,
is a satisfaction of all the damage sustained.'
A retraxit is a voluntary renunciation by the plaintiff in open
court. It must be in person and not by attorney.' It operates to
end the litigation, the plaintiff being barred from any new action
on the same cause.1 A retraxit as such is generally nonexistent
today, the matter being covered by the statues as to discontinuance and nonsuits. It is omitted from the English Judicature
Act.8
Nonsuit at common law was the judgment given against the
plaintiff when he was not in court to answer to the demand of the
defendant. In early cases he was demandable at - arious times
during the life of the action, but it soon became the practice to
call him to hear the verdict of the jury only. If he was not in
court no verdict could be given, and the judgment went against
him. The origin of this necessity of his presence to enable any
verdict to be rendered is shrouded in antiquity. It was well estab2 Examples of discontinuance are: a failure to file pleadings after the declaration,
a failure to enter judgment after verdict, or a failure to take advantage of the
defendant's inadequate pleading.
See STEPHEN, PLEADING, 216 and cases cited.
Campbell v.
And a demurrer to the defendant's demurrer is a discontinuance.
St. John, 1 Salk. 219. See also Buena Vista Freestone Co. v. Parrish, 34 W. Va.
652, 12 S. E. 817 (1891) ; Lawrence v. Winifrede Coal Co., 48 W. Va. 139, 35 S. E.
925 (1900) ; Marcus v. McClure, 63 W. Va. 215, 59 S. E. 1055 (1907).
3 See 2 CHITTY, ARCnBISHoP PRACTICE, 1409; 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMNENTA5ES,
396; 3 CHITTY, PRACTICE, 10. See also West virginia cases cited in note 2, supra.
See 1 CHITTY, PLEADING, *426. See also 1 wins. Saund. 207n (1668).
See 1 Wins. Saund. 213, note A; Beechers Case, 8
5 Cooper v. Tiffin. 3 Term 511.
CoKE 58. See West Virginia cases cited in note 2. supra. See also Henry v.
Ohio River Railroad Co., 40 W. Va. 234, 21 S. E. 863 (1895).
6 Lowry v. McMillan, 8 Pa. 163 (1846) ; Barnard 4. Dagget, 68 Ind. 305 (1876);
Muse v. Farmers' Bank, 27 Grat. 252 (Va. 1876). See Forest Coal Co. 4. Doolittle,
See also 8 COKE 58a. In West
54 W. Va. 210, 224, 46 S. B. 238, 242 (1903).
Virginia, apparently, an attorney may enter a retraxit if he has express authority
to do so. Forest Coal Co. v. Doolittle, supra.
7 See COKE LITTLETON, 139a. The judgment was "Quod nihiZ cap' per breve suum
pracd," sed sit in misericor' pro fals, clai,' etc." Forest Coal Co. 4. Doolittle,
aupra; Hoover v. MItchell, 25 Grat. 387 (Va. 1874).
8 See AcicKOL, PRACTICE, 13 ed., which states that as retraxit is very unusual
in practice, it was unnecessary to consider it. See Herbert v. Sayer, 2 D & L. 49,
65 (1844).
See also TIDD, PRACTICE, 9 ed., (1828), which covers it briefly, so
it"was evidently of some importance at that date.
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lished by 1371, as the plaintiff is found taking a nonsuit by refusing
to appear, in the easel of Wilkes v. Gernon,9 the nonsuit being noted
without comment by the reporter. The explanation given by Coke,
and Blackstone,10 that it was because the plaintiff had not followed his suit, sounds like a specious reason put behind an accepted rule.
The reason given by Tidd" that the plaintiff had to be present
to be amerced, should judgment go against him, is clearly unten.
able, because the plaintiff was amerced if nonsuited, for not being
present.2 The theory was not, as might be supposed, that the dignity of the court had suffered, as the plaintiff could be nonsuited
only at the demand of the defendant, so that if neither party appeared, judgment of nonsuit could not be entered.' 3 The King
could never be nonsuit, for he was considered as always present
in court.'
The custom of demanding the plaintiff when verdict
was to be rendered became obsolete, and he was not called unless
he had failed to make out his case or expressed a desire to become
nonsuit.15
The great advantage of the nonsuit to the plaintiff was that,
while it ended the particular action and made him liable for costs,
it did not include him as to further actions on the same cause of
action. It is clear that at common law the plaintiff had an absolute right to become nonsuit at any time before the jury rendered
the verdict."
And it is equally clear that the plaintiff could
not be nonsuited if he did not assent,' 7 despite some opinion to the
9 YEAR BOOK, 48 Edw. III 30, 17. See LIBRARY AssocATlON 301, 312; S. C.
ibid. 304-5. See also BELLE:wE, 251-2, where Belknap, C. 3., in 1382 asserted
emphatically this power of becoming nonsuit "a chec. temps avant plain verdict
dit."
10 See 3 BLCXS51ONE, COmMENTARiES, 376, citing Coke. See also COXYN, DIGEST,
PLEADER, X, 3.
1 See TIDD, PRACTICE 9 ed., 867.
. .
but before they gave their verdict,
it was formerly usual to call or demand the plaintiff, in order to answer the
law
he
was
liable,
in case he failed his suit."
amercement to which by the old
12 The Judgment of nonsuit was "Ideo considerat' est quad praed' querens et plegit
8ui de prosequendo sint inde in misaricordia. . . et praed' def. est inde sine die."'
13 Arnold v. Johnson, 1 Str. 266 (1720) ; Heath v. Walker, 2 Str. 1117. But
curiously, in an undefended action, the plaintiff may be nonsuited with his consent. 4 B. & Aid. 413.
14 See Cox, 227b (f).
As to whether he might take a voluntary nonsuit, quaaret
35 Note 11, supra. In Jackson v. Wiltamson, 2 T. R. 281 (D. & E.), it appears that
the plaintiff was not in court when the verdict was rendered.
16 Note 9, supra. Robinson v. Lawrence, 21 L. J. (N. S.) Exch. 36; Outhwaite v.
Hudson, 7 Exch. 980, 21 L. J. Exch. 151.
17 Minebin v. Clement 1 B. & Aid. 252; Stancliff v. Clark, 7 Exch. 439, 21 L. J.
(N. S.) 128; Mounson v. Redsbaw, 1 Wins. Saund. 195 d, 6 ed.. note (i). Marcus
See MacBeath v. Haldimand,
v. McClure, 63 W. Va. 215, 59 S. E. 1055 (1907).
1 T. R. 172, 175. See also 1 CHrrTY', ARCHBISHOP, PRACTICE, 13 ed., 377. In
West Virginia, certain statutes provide for dismissal of an action when the
plaintiff fails to plead or otherwise to prosecute his action. W. VA. CODE, c. 125
i§. 6, 7; idem, c. 127, § 8. But since the dismissal results from the plaintiff's
negligence, It is practically based on his assent. Lawrence v. Winifrede Coal Co.,
48 W. Va. 139, 35 S. E. 925 (1900).
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contrary.ls This contrary opinion has probably resulted from two
things. The judgment of nonsuit at the early common law where
the plaintiff was inadvertently absent when demanded was called
an involuntary nonsuit, which is not the sense in which the term
peremptory nonsuit is used today. And further, when the judge
expressed an opinion that the plaintiff should became nonsuit, he
usually did so, because of the power of the judge to direct a verdict against him if he persisted in his action. This in effect
amounted to a peremptory nonsuit, although the plaintiff could
insist on going to the jury.19 An illogical distinction was drawn between the voluntary withdrawal and the withdrawal under threat
of a directed verdict. When the plaintiff took a nonsuit of his
own motion he was out of court, and could not move to set aside
the nonsuit.20 When he submitted to a nonsuit on the advice of
the judge, the cases are in conflict as to his further rights. Lord
Mansfield laid down the rule that where a judge at nisi prius nonsuits the plaintiff and is mistaken the court upon motion may set
aside the nonsuit.21 There are some decisions contra.2 2 On principle it seems that if the plaintiff doubts the correctness of the
judge's advice he should be required to base his claim of error on
the directed verdict and not on a judgment of nonsuit to which he
need not have assented, and which leaves his action unconcluded.
An exception might be made where the trial court wishes to get the
opinion of the full bench on the law applicable to the case, and
23
takes this method.
Some early English cases allowed the plaintiff to take a nonsuit
after verdict for him, when he was dissatisfied with the damages,
but this right was taken away by the statute 2 Hen. 4, c. 7, which
provided "that after verdict a plaintiff shall not be nonsuit.""
"ASee STORy, PLEADING IN CrviL ACTIONS, 2 ed., 726, introduction. See also
Johnson's dissenting opinion in Elmore v. Grymes, 1 Pet. 469 (U. S. 1828).
's MacBeath v. Haldimand, supra.
SBarnes y. whiteman, 9 Dowl. 181; Austin v. Evans, 2 M. & G. 430. See Hutchinson v. Brice, 5 Burr. 2692.
3 Sadler v. Evans, 4 Burr, 1894. In accord with this are: Minehin v. Clement,
8upra; Alexander v. Barker, 2 Cromp. & J. 133, Sweet v. Iiee, 4 Scott N. R.
86, 3 Mf. & G. 452. Contra: Ward v. Mason, 9 Price 291, 294, 296.
Cossar v. Reed 21 L. J. Q. B. 18, 17 Q. B. 540; Hartley -v.Atkinson, 2 Barnes
255; Simpson v. Clayton, 2 Bing. N. Cas. 467.
Treacher v. Hinton, 4 B. & Aid. 413. In West Virginia, a statute reads as
follows : "Any circuit court may on motion, reinstate on the trial docket of the
court, any case dismissed, and set aside any nonsuit that may be entered by reason of the non-appearance of the plaintiff, within three terms after the order of
dismissal may have been made, or order of nonsuit entered." W. VA. CODE, C. 127,
§ 11.
U

Keat v. Barker, 5 Mod. 208.
SMITH, ACTION AT LAw, 2 ed., 129.

A See
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This does not preclude a nonsuit when verdict was for the plaintiff
by consent with a point reserved.25
The common-law nonsuit is the result of a legal rule retained
in our law after its purpose has been lost sight of and any possible
reason for its existence has disappeared. In its inception it was
under the control of the magistrate because of the power of amercement wielded by him. -" A plaintiff did not lightly subject himself to this punishment. But the amercement very early ceased
to be enforced, Lord Coke speaking of it as a bygone custom. The
exact time when it became obsolete cannot be fixed because the
form of the judgment contained the amercement clause down to
modern times, and the judgment was not perfect without it. The
plaintiff's privilege of becoming nonsuit is obviously unjust to the
defendant. The plaintiff could bring his action, carry it through
several years of litigation, subject the state and defendant to expense and loss of time, and then, having uncovered all the defenses,
at any time before the jury rendered its verdict, assert his uncontrolled right to become nonsuit, leaving himself free to commence
another action on the same cause immediately. He could not even
be forced to become nonsuit. The mere statement of the results
discloses the obvious injustice and inequality of giving that right,
but it has taken modern statutes to give any remedy. As far back
as 1371 it was causing trouble, as the reporter in Wilkes v. Gernoe2
gives a record of many days' litigation with the result best pictured
in his own words. "And the jurors were under guard for three
days before they could agree: now when they were finally at the
bar ready to have rendered their verdict the plaintiffs were nonsuited etc." Five hundred years later the Judicature Act brought
relief in England. By the Hilary rules nonsuit and discontinuance
had been combined, making it a matter of right to discontinue at
any time before verdict on payment of costs.2' In 1873 the Judicature Act cut down the discontinuances as a matter of right. By R.
S. C., 0. 23, r. 1., "The plaintiff may at any time before receipt
2 The judgment was that the losing party be at the mercy of the court (8it n
misericordia). The penalty was then liquidated by the affeFrors. As distinguished
from a fine, the amercement was for a lesser offense, might be imposed by a
court not of record and lay in the discretion of the court, while a fine was for a
serious offense, Iuch as in appeals of death or robbery where the judgment was
BACON, ABR., FINES AND AMRCEthat the losing party be fined and imprisoned.
SIENTS.

-

Note

9 supra.

The injustice and hardship of the rule has been recognized

in the local court. Henry v. Ohio River Railroad Co., 40 W. Va. 234, 21 S. D.
863 (1895).
23 See R. G., H. T., 1853, Rule 23. See also 2 CHITTY, ARCHBOLD, 12 ed., 1483.
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of the defendant's statement of defense, or after the receipt thereof, before taking any other proceeding in the action (save any interlocutory application), by notice in writing, wholly discontinue his
action . . . ." The nonsuit was retained in name, but it was
made to act as a retraxit,concluding the plaintiff. R. S. 0., 0. 41,
r. 6., "Any judgment of nonsuit, unless the court or judge otherwise directs, shall have the same effect as a judgment on the merits
for the defendant; but in any case of mistake, surprise, or accident, and judgment of nonsuit may be set aside on such terms
. . . as to the court or judge shall seem just." In 1883 this section was repealed and the above section as to discontinuance was
2"
left unchanged, making it cover both discontinuance and nonsuit.
To summarize, in English practice of today the plaintiff has lost his
common-law right to become nonsuit. When he once commences
his action and any step is taken after receipt of the defense, he
must carry the action through or lose his right of action, unless
given leave by the judge to discontinue.3 0
The common-law nonsuit in the United States has in the main
followed the English rules. The plaintiff could take a nonsuit at
any time before verdict, and by the great weight of authority could
not take it after verdict.3 There is, however, a split of authority
as to the common-law right of the judge to order a peremptory nonsuit. Many jurisdictions including the federal courts followed the English decisions and held that there could be no peremptory nonsuit.32 Others established a peremptory nonsuit by decision, helped by the prevalent belief that it had been allowed by
the English common law.3 3 In these states the judge may nonsuit the plaintiff on his opening statement, although this power
obviously must be wielded with caution. The same result was
reached in Pennsylvania by statute.3 4 The peremptory nonsuit is
no infringement of the right to trial by jury. 5
The time after which the plaintiff could not of right become nonsuit was too firmly fixed in the common law to be changed by the
- See Fox v. Star Newspaper Co. Ltd.; [1898U 1 Q. B. 636, 639; [1900] A. C.
19. See also SCOTT, CASES ON PROCEDURE, 308.
30 Merchants' Bank w. Rawls, 7 Ga. 191 (1849) ; Washburn v. Allen, 77 Me. 344
(1885). See Van Wagenen v. Chladek, 27 S. D. 436, 439,131 N. W. 507, 508 (1911).
31 Elmore v. Grymes, 1 Pet. 469 U. S. 1828) ; Rankin v. Curtenius, 12 I1. 334
(1851) ; Hudson v. Strickland, 49 Miss. 591 (1873); Smith v. Crane, 12 Vt. 487
(1E40).
Such is the rule in West Virginia. See cases cited in note 17, supra.
32 Ensminger v. McIntire, 23 Cal. 593 (1863) ; Bailey v. Kimball, 26 N. H.
351 (1853) ;
Deyo v. N. Y. Cent. R. R, 34 N. Y. 9 (1865) ; Spensley v.
Lancashire Ins. Co., 54 Wis. 433, 11 N. W. 894 (1882).
= LAwS PA., Act March 11, 1836.

U Coughran v. Bigelow, 164 U. S. 301 (1896).
w Whitted v. S. W. Tel. Co., 217 Fed. 835 (Ark. 1914); Westby v. Gray, 116
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courts of the states, and statutes were required to cut down the
right of the plaintiff. In some states the plaintiff may not become
nonsuit after the cause is finally submitted to the court or jury,
or after the jury has retired.30 Under such statutes there is a conflict of authority as to whether the plaintiff may take a nonsuit
after the court grants a motion to direct a verdict. The majority
hold it is then too late,3 7 with some decisions contra." These
contra decisions would seem to defeat the intent of the statutory
change, as a verdict could never be directed against an alert plaintiff without his consent. A few states do not allow nonsuit as of
right, after argument on the facts.39 In Massachusetts, by decision,
the plaintiff has been limited to the period before the trial commences, 40 and many states have the same rule by statute.-"
When the defendant has filed a counterclaim or set-off there is
:nuch diversity in the cases. There are three possible holdings,
(a) that the plaintiff may not thereafter take a nonsuit, (b) that
he may take a nonsuit and defeat the counterclaim, or, (c) that he
may dismiss his own action, leaving the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim. In a majority of the jurisdictions either by statute
or decision, the plaintiff's right to a nonsuit is lost after counterclaim or set-off has been interposed.4 2 In North Carolina this rule
is limited to cases where the counterclaim arises out of the same
cause of action. 43 Other jurisdictions by statute allow the plaintiff
to become nonsuit but retain the counterclaim for trial.44 This rule
obviously is not applicable in those states in which the defendant
may not obtain an affirmative judgment.
The principle of stare decisis is relatively unimportant in procedure and practice, and the defects in the rules as to nonsuit could
have been corrected by decision in our courts. But there has been
Cal. 660, 48 Pac. 800 (1897) ; Dunn v. Wolf, 81 Ia. 688, 47 N. W. 887 (1891). In
"A party shall not allow to suffer a
West Virginia, the statute reads:
nonsult, unless he do so before the jury retire from the bar. " W. VA. CODE,
e. 131, § 11. The rule is the same upon a demurrer to evidence. Frymier v.
Lorama R. Co., 103 S. E. 366 (W. Va. 1920).
38 WhItted v. S. W. Tel. Co., supra; Dobkin v. Dittmers, 76 N. J. L. 235, 69
At. 1013 (1908).
3 Oppenheimer v. Elmore, 109 Ia. 196, 80 N. W. 307 (1899).
28 Easter v. Overlea Land Co., 128 Md. 99, 99 AtI. 893 (1917).
39 Truro v. Atkins, 122 Mass. 418 (1877).
40 Day v. Mountin, 89 Minn. 297, 94 N. W. 88.7 (1903). State v. Pitchford, 171
Pac. 448 (Okl. 1918) ; Hutchings v. Royal Bakery Co., 60 Ore. 48, 118 Pac.
185 (1911).
1 Wood v. Jordan, 125 Cal. 263, 57 Pa. 998 (1899) ; Long v. McGowan, 16
Colo. App. 540, 66 Pac. 1076 (1901) ; Means v. Welle, 12 Metc. 356 (Mass.
1847); Griffin ;. Jorgenson, 22 Minn. 92 (1875) (by decision).
' McLean v. McDonald 173 N. C. 429; 92 S. E. 148 (1912).
'3 Gurr v. Brinson. 138 Ga. 665, 75 S. E. 979 (1912); Hamlin v. Walker. 228
Mo. 611, 128 S. E. 945 (1910) ; Railroad v. Sater, 1 Ia. 421 (1853) (by decision).
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a uniform refusal to modify the common-law nonsuit, with the one
exception of the peremptory nonsuit. Legislative action has been
necessary to bring relief, but it has been only partial. It is difficult
to see why the court should not have the power to direct a peremptory nonsuit, as to deny him the power is to force him to send the
case to the jury with instructions to find for the defendant. When
it is apparent that the plaintiff cannot recover, and a verdict will
have to be directed against him, the court should be allowed to stop
the action at once, subject to a review by an appellate court for
abuse of discretion. In those states which do not allow it today it
is due either to fear of giving the judge too much power, or to
mere inertia, neither of which is a valid ground for inaction. The
second problem, which has been met by the Codes, is the setting
of the time after which the nonsuit ceases to be a matter of right.
The old common law time of the rendering of the verdict is indefensible, and the legislative change to the time of submission of the
issue to the jury is but a slight improvement. When the plaintiff has once fairly launched his cause of action the discontinuance
of it should be within the control of the judge. There are three
points at which the limit might be set, namely, the fiing of the complaint, at some point in the pleadings, or the commencement of the
trial. No jurisdiction has adopted the first, and this seems wise, bet,
cause the plaintiff should be allowed a chance to see the defense before being compelled to elect. There is no serious objection to his
withdrawal when the defense is filed. There is little to chose between the second and third; it is a matter of practical expediency.
What arguments there are for one or the other favor the English
rule (receipt of the defense and the taking of any further step).
This has the advantage of definiteness, and elimination of unnecessary steps. Either of these rules safeguards both the parties and
protects the state, and is in harmony with the tendency of the day
in conferring broader discretionary powers on the magistrate.
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